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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 36
QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 20 April 1990 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the declaration of the special meeting of the United Nations Council for Namibia held at Windhoek from 9 to 11 April 1990.

I should like to request that the declaration and the annexes thereto be circulated as an official document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lt. Gen. Peter D. ZUZE
President of the
United Nations Council for Namibia

ANNEX

Declaration of the special meeting of the United Nations Council for Namibia, held at Windhoek from 9 to 11 April 1990

1. Twenty-three years ago, the United Nations assumed direct responsibility for Namibia and established the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal administering authority for the Territory until independence. On 21 March 1990, that responsibility was fulfilled when Namibia attained freedom and independence.

2. It is with great joy that the United Nations Council for Namibia, meeting in special session at Windhoek, capital of the new nation, greets the people of Namibia on the occasion of their independence.

3. The achievement of this lofty goal is a fitting tribute to the heroism and determination of the Namibian people in their long and difficult struggle for national liberation in which the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) played the leading role. The sacrifices suffered by the Namibians and the spirit of statesmanship, co-operation and far-sightedness their leaders have displayed in the political and diplomatic arena have been of crucial importance for Namibia's accession to independence.

4. For more than a century Namibians were denied freedom. And yet this denial did not distance them from the faith and values that freedom compels. They have remained true to that faith and those values when truth was denied them. They have been just when justice was kept beyond their reach. They have shown strength where history had made them weak. Their hopes have endured a hundred years of unfulfilled promises. Today those hopes have been finally realized.

5. The struggle and determination of the Namibian people have been infused by international support, assistance and solidarity. The role played by the United Nations as a whole in this regard has been unique and historic. The commitment of Member States to the Namibian cause has been reflected in the activities of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations. The Security Council ensured the critical implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group for Namibia, and its completion under the guidance of the Secretary-General. Indeed, the fulfilment of this mandate is a tribute to the strength, resilience and capacity of the world body.

6. The United Nations Council for Namibia notes with appreciation the very important and inspiring address of H.E. Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia, at the commencement of the meeting.

7. The Council expresses its profound gratitude to the Government and people of the Republic of Namibia for the invitation extended to the Council to hold its special plenary meetings at Windhoek an for the facilities provided for that purpose, which have contributed to the success of the meeting, and in particular for the very generous and warm hospitality accorded to the participants, observers and secretariat staff throughout their stay in Namibia.

8. The United Nations Council for Namibia places on record its deep appreciation of the support extended to the Namibian people by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the front-line States, and the many other nations, non-governmental organizations and individuals who have selflessly devoted themselves to the Namibian cause.

9. For more than two decades the mission of the Council has been inspired, invigorated and given direction by the steadfastness of the Namibian people and the solidarity of the international community. The Council is proud of the assistance it has been able to extend to the Namibian people throughout its existence. While expressing deep appreciation for the generosity extended by freedom loving peoples, the Council calls upon all to address with equal fervour and concern the immense challenges facing the new nation.

10. The Council recognizes that some of its current programmes and activities remain incomplete. In this connection the Council decides to immediately arrange, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Namibia, to co-ordinate the smooth transfer of the programmes, activities, and assets of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

11. The Council shares the commitment of the world community that independent Namibia be assured of complete territorial integrity, security of frontiers, sovereignty over its resources as well as unhindered and equal opportunity for its citizens to realize their full human potential.

12. We pay special tribute to the wisdom and vision with which members of Namibia's Constituent Assembly worked out a Constitution for the new nation in openness and harmony. The pace and diligence with which they completed their work reflect Namibia's determination to be free.

13. The Republic of Namibia has now assumed its rightful place in the comity of nations. On this solemn occasion, when the mandate entrusted to it by the world community stands fulfilled, the United Nations Council for Namibia is proud to recommend to the General Assembly its own dissolution.

14. Today we celebrate the dawn of a new era and welcome the rise of a new star on the African continent. The Namibian people have finally regained liberty and are now working towards the establishment of an equal and just society.

15. Namibia, we salute you.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 94, 103, 104, 112, 113 and 142
of the preliminary list*
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 24 April 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my Government to draw your attention to the attached extract from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, published by the Department of State of the United States of America, which contains information on the situation concerning human rights in Mauritania (including the persistence of the practice of slavery). I have underlined passages of special relevance.

In view of the importance of this information, I have the honour to request that this attached extract be issued as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 94, 103, 104, 112, 113 and 142 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Johanan BEIN
Ambassador
Acting Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX*

101st Congress
2d Session

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

FEBRUARY 1990

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* Underlining has been added by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

MAURITANIA

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has been governed since 1978 by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN). Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid'ahmed Taya, President of the Committee and Chief of State, assumed power in 1984 after the bloodless ouster of the former president, Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla. All 19 members of the Military Committee hold ministerial portfolios or occupy other key military or government positions. The Committee functions as a legislative body, while the President, assisted by his Council of Ministers and a few close advisers, wields the executive power. Political parties are not allowed in Mauritania.

The security forces number about 16,000 and, in addition to the regular armed forces, include the National Guard, the gendarmerie (a specialized corps of paramilitary police) and the police. The National Guard and police come under the Minister of Interior and all have internal security functions. Over the past 3 years, the Government purged security forces of hundreds of suspected dissidents, particularly non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians and Pan-Arab Baathists.

Mauritania continues to face massive economic and social problems: drought, desertification, insect infestation, the Western Sahara conflict, extensive unemployment, one of the highest per capita foreign debts in Africa, poor infrastructure, inadequate health and education systems, and exodus from rural areas. Although adequate rains fell in 1988 and 1989, the prior drought years forced large numbers of nomads into towns, with a consequent weakening of traditional Maur nomadic culture, and a severe strain on government resources. In addition, mutual expulsions and repatriations between Senegal and Mauritania after April 1989 resulted in the movement of more than 100,000 people, placing an unprecedented economic and social strain on Mauritanian society. Many of the Mauritanians who returned had been prosperous merchants in Senegal, and important sources of foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, many of the black Africans who departed had held important technical and skilled positions in Mauritania.

The human rights situation in Mauritania deteriorated dramatically in 1989. In April Mauritania experienced one of its most serious crises since independence, when anti-Senegalese rioting in Mauritania and anti-Mauritanian rioting in Senegal left hundreds dead. In the aftermath of the rioting, tens of thousands of Senegalese citizens as well as Pulaar-speaking Mauritanian citizens were expelled to Senegal. Tens of thousands of Mauritanians and Senegalese of Maur origin similarly fled or were expelled from Senegal. Subsequently, the Mauritanian Government dismissed many Halpulaar civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises from their positions. Although the Mauritanian authorities argued that the expellees were not true Mauritanians, but rather Senegalese with false identity papers, the fact remains that in all cases persons were forcibly removed, often without being allowed to retain their possessions, and without due process of law. Reports of unlawful detention and torture also surfaced during 1989, and most other human rights, including political freedoms, remained tightly circumscribed.

MAURITANIA

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There have been no substantiated cases of members of the Government or security forces perpetrating politically motivated killings. However, serious questions remain regarding the role of the Mauritanian security forces in the initial riots on April 24-25. During the early stages of the rioting, some police officers stood by without intervening, or may even have goaded on the rioters. The Mauritanian army was called in to quell the disturbances only on April 25. Whether these incidents reflected official government policy, or were isolated instances of individuals acting on their own, is unknown. The net results of the violence were numerous deaths and extensive property damage. The Government conceded a death toll of several scores, while other sources contended that several hundred persons may have died.

b. Disappearances

There were no substantiated reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Mauritanian law specifically precludes the use of torture. There were, however, recurring reports during 1989 that the security forces used torture against dissidents and against some non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians.

On February 27, five leaders of the December 1988-January 1989 student strike at the university of Nouakchott released a report describing their 4-day interrogation and torture at the hands of the police in December 1988. The students said they were deprived of food and sleep, forced to stand without clothes outdoors in the chill of night, kicked and beaten with rubber hoses, and suspended by their hands and feet from a steel beam until they became unconscious. Several also had their heads kept immersed in water until they feared drowning. According to their report, upon their release, several of the students could not walk and remained bedridden for over a week. The students provided the names of several of their alleged police torturers in their report. The Government is not known to have acted against the alleged torturers; neither, however, did it retaliate against the students, although the report was circulated widely.

In the aftermath of the April rioting, there were recurrent unsubstantiated reports of police detention and torture of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians, particularly in the regions along the Senegal river. These reports generally involved incidents in small villages or remote areas and were thus difficult to verify. The recurring nature of these reports, however, lends credence to the overall impression that incidents of torture did in fact take place.

One report issued by Amnesty International (AI) involved the headmaster of a school in Tetiane, who was allegedly detained and tortured by the police in Kaedi in early June. The headmaster reportedly died as a result of this treatment. The

same report alleged that four Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanian herdsmen were detained, tortured, and possibly killed by the police in the Kaedi and M'bout region, also in June. Numerous other unsubstantiated allegations of torture surfaced, often involving efforts by the local security forces to intimidate or force Pulaar or Wolof-speaking black Mauritanians into leaving their homes and going to Senegal.

Responsibility for such alleged activities is difficult to determine; there may have been incidents in which local security forces acted independently, without orders from their superiors. Furthermore, in several areas along the river local militias of mostly Hassaniya-speaking white and black Maurs were formed, ostensibly to guard against cross-border incursions from Senegal. Since some of these civilians were armed, it is possible that some cases of torture were carried out by these militias. On balance, even though some senior members of the regime continued to voice opposition to the use of torture, reports suggest that its use increased during 1989, especially in the aftermath of the April intercommunal violence, and there were no known instances of the Government punishing those responsible.

Prison conditions in Mauritania are harsh. Four political prisoners died from disease and malnutrition at Oualata Prison in 1988, in part because the prison commandant was systematically withholding food. As a result of these deaths and the international pressures they caused, the remaining prisoners were subsequently removed from Oualata, and the commandant was dismissed and reprimanded.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Mauritanian law in principle assures expeditious arraignment and trial, access to legal counsel, and the right of appeal. The courts must review the legality of a person's detention no more than 72 hours after his or her arrest. Compliance with this law, however, is inconsistent. For example, the five leaders of the University of Nouakchott student strike were detained for 4 days in December 1988 without a hearing. AI has also reported that one of these students, Abdallahi Ould Bah Nagi, was subsequently detained by the police on May 29 and held without a hearing. The apparent reason for his detention was his role in the distribution of a leaflet criticizing the expulsion of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians by the Mauritanian Government.

In the aftermath of the April riots, there were widespread stories--often from persons in refugee camps in Senegal--of detention by local officials of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanians living in the Senegal river valley. For example, three high school teachers were reportedly arrested and detained by gendarmerie in Bababe and eventually expelled to Senegal. There were numerous reports of intimidation, arrests, prolonged detention, and expulsion centering on security forces in Kaedi and Rosso.

AI also reported that a number of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanian civil servants, including Oumir Tall, Amidou Tidiane Ly, Memkoudou Diop, Abdanlage Wane, were arrested and detained incommunicado in May 1989 in Nouakchott. These detainees were not charged with any offense, although unofficial sources suggested that they were held because of suspected involvement in movements opposed to the Government.

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In mid-November, there were widespread, credible reports of the arrest, detention, and possible torture of a number of Halpulaar teachers in the town of Kaedi. As many as 50 persons may have been detained without being officially charged, and by year's end their status remained unresolved.

Internal exile is a method of removing opposition figures from the public eye. Former President Haidalla and five of his associates, who were arrested during the 1984 coup but never charged, reportedly still remain in internal exile in remote locations. There were credible reports of the detention and exile without charges of several black Mauritanian civil servants and military personnel since May 1989. Many more were expelled to Senegal, in lieu of internal exile.

With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The legal system functions primarily under the Shari'a (Islamic law) put in place during the Haidalla regime. The Ministry of Justice plays the major role in administering the Shari'a and selecting judicial personnel. The Shari'a applies to most crimes and offenses, with the exception of commercial and banking offenses, traffic violations that cause bodily harm, and offenses against the security of the State. These three categories of offenses are all handled by the Special Court, which renders its judgments on the basis of laws modeled after French law. The Taya administration has urged the Islamic judges not to use extreme physical punishments, such as amputations, which occurred during the Haidalla regime. The Taya Government is slowly eliminating a number of unqualified Shari'a judges who were appointed during the Haidalla years. By virtue of a recent government decision, judges cannot be tenured before 7 years of service.

While trials in the ordinary courts are public, the State Security Court, which tries offenses against state security, may conduct secret trials. All defendants, regardless of the court, have the right to be present with legal counsel during the proceedings. If necessary, the accused is provided counsel at public expense. Defendants may confront witnesses and present evidence. They may appeal the sentences of the ordinary courts but not those of the Security Court. While the judiciary is nominally independent, some knowledgable observers have claimed that judges take their cue from the Government when sentencing opponents of the regime.

The right to a fair public trial in Mauritania was, by any standard, severely abused during 1989. After April, thousands of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians, particularly in the Halpulaar community, were expelled to Senegal without any recourse to judicial proceedings. Those expelled often had no advance warning of their expulsion and no time or opportunity to carry any possessions with them. According to reports from refugee camps in Senegal, many were forced across the frontier river at gunpoint.

The Mauritanian Government contended that many, if not all, of the persons expelled were in fact of Senegalese nationality, and that their Mauritanian identity documents were fraudulent. Even if this were the case, an arbitrary determination of nationality seems to have been made without according due process to those affected. Furthermore, the Mauritanian Government appears to have ignored its own law, which

specifies that all persons, including foreigners, have a right to the protection of their property and possessions and cannot be deprived of them except by a court decision. The widespread and credible reports of confiscation and destruction of identity papers by security forces indicated a conscious and concerted effort to circumvent the legal process.

The number of political detainees and prisoners held at the end of 1989 was unknown. In December the Government released 19 political prisoners, including the head of the outlawed Baathist Party arrested in 1988, and 18 non-Hassaniya-speaking black political activists convicted in October 1986 following antigovernment political agitation.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

In the past, government surveillance of individuals was generally limited to patrols on major highways and customs checkpoints, occasional nighttime inspections of vehicular traffic, and inspections of mail suspected of containing currency or prohibited items. Under Mauritanian law, the police require warrants to perform home searches.

The right to privacy was severely abused in Mauritania after April 1989. Expulsions of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanians involved systematic entry of homes by security forces and forcible removal of families, without search warrants or any legal proceedings. These activities occurred predominantly in villages along the river, and thus it is unclear to what extent they were officially sanctioned by the Mauritanian Government, and to what extent they were the the work of overzealous local officials. After repeated diplomatic protests, the expulsions appeared to slow dramatically after mid-July, and there were reasons to believe that the Government was making efforts to control the situation. Nevertheless, there were continuing reports of government surveillance of suspected dissidents, as well as intimidation and harassment of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanians in the Senegal River valley.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and press is restricted. While Mauritanians may criticize government policies in conversations with friends and relatives, they are somewhat more inhibited in speaking with foreigners. Military personnel are under tight surveillance, and expression of views that could be construed as even mildly critical of the Government is likely to result in close questioning by military security officers. The Government is quick to react to any public comments it thinks pose a threat to the security of the State. Many of those persons detained without a trial during 1989, including the five student strike leaders as well as many civil servants, were targets, it is believed, precisely because they voiced opposition to the current regime and its policies. In particular, the Government appeared to be sensitive to any expression of ethnic dissatisfaction or criticism of its ethnic policies.

Mauritania's only daily newspaper and the radio and television stations are government owned and operated. During the past 3 years the Government has allowed a limited amount of

discussion of government policies within the context of interviews with government officials. In early 1988, the Government authorized the publication of two privately owned monthly magazines, Mauritanie Demain and L'Evenement. These publications periodically carried articles on mildly controversial social issues, but they refrained from any direct criticism of the Government.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Mauritanian law recognizes the rights of assembly and association, but since the 1978 coup the Government has banned all political movements and generally prohibited meetings of a political nature. Any formal grouping must be registered with the Minister of Interior. The Government usually does not interfere with assemblies and associations as long as they avoid political activity.

c. Freedom of Religion

Islam is the official religion of Mauritania; virtually all citizens are Muslim. Mauritanian Muslims are prohibited from entering non-Islamic houses of worship and from converting to another religion. Proselytizing by non-Muslims and the construction of Christian churches and other non-Islamic houses of worship require government permission. The Roman Catholic community in Mauritania has five churches which operate freely as long as they restrict their services to resident foreigners.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Traditionally, there have been few restrictions on movement within Mauritania, where nomadism has long been a way of life. Travelers, however, are subjected to routine police and customs checks along all major roads and at the country's international and domestic airports. During the riots of April 1989, dusk-to-dawn curfews were imposed in Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, and some other cities but were reduced and finally lifted as the situation calmed. During the final months of 1989, as cross-border incidents from Senegal increased, curfews were imposed in a number of villages in the Senegal river valley as well. Since 1985 Mauritanians no longer need an exit visa to travel abroad, although there were reports of some persons being denied passports.

During 1989 large numbers of Mauritanians had their citizenship effectively revoked and were subsequently expelled to Senegal. The revocations of citizenship, which may have involved as many as 50,000 people, appear in many cases to have been based entirely on ethnicity. Only non-Hassaniya-speaking Mauritanians, particularly Halpulaar and, to a much lesser degree, other black African ethnic groups, were affected. Many of these displaced persons were not accorded Senegalese citizenship and thus in effect became stateless persons. At year's end, the Mauritanian Government had not taken specific steps to permit access to the courts by expellees who wished to obtain confirmation of their citizenship and right to return home. However, there was a small but indeterminate number of cases of acknowledged Mauritanians being allowed to return, apparently as a result of individual extrajudicial petitions or intervention by officials.

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As many as 80,000 displaced persons arrived in Mauritania from Senegal during April and May of 1989. While many of these were Mauritanian citizen repatriates, many others were Senegalese citizens of ethnic Maur origin. The arrival of these repatriates and refugees placed a heavy additional burden on the Mauritanian economy. Although hard pressed for resources, the Mauritanian Government made commendable and largely successful efforts to assist all those arriving from Senegal. The Government also permitted the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to establish temporary offices in Nouakchott to provide aid to displaced persons. There were no reports of refugees being returned forcibly to Senegal.

As a result of the ongoing conflict in neighboring Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a small number of refugees from the Western Sahara have settled in Nouadhibou and other northern towns. They have been successfully absorbed into Mauritanian society.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Citizens of Mauritania are unable democratically to change their government at the national level. All political power rests in the hands of the military regime. The Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) remains the "custodian of the nation's sovereignty," and all executive and legislative functions reside with it. Membership is limited to military officers who occupy ministerial positions or important military and security posts. The CMSN is predominantely comprised of Hassaniya-speaking Maurs, although members of other ethnic groups are members. However, non-Maur membership on the CMSN, as well as among those holding senior government or military positions, decreased in 1989 in the wake of ethnic tensions.

In early January, the Government held elections in 164 rural communes. All Mauritanians, aged 21 years or older and residing in these localities, were entitled to vote, and the ballot was secret. In most localities, two or more slates of candidates competed for the electorate's vote.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Taya Government in the past has been generally responsive to human rights concerns. For example, it cooperated with the U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group on slavery by allowing a representative to come to Mauritania to obtain information on this issue. In 1987 the Government permitted representatives of AI to visit Nouakchott for discussions on racial and ethnic tensions in Mauritania. In 1988 a delegation from the International Commission of Jurists and the Chairman of the African Jurists Association visited Mauritania to review human rights practices.

As a result of President Taya's public support for basic human rights, the Mauritanian Human Rights League was formed in 1986. The League, which is affiliated with the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights, is staffed by volunteers who address such concerns as eradicating remaining vestiges of slavery, ensuring the uniform application of

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MAURITANIA

Shari'a law, promoting the status of women, and preventing abuses such as arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. In 1988, the League hosted the first conference on Maghrebian human rights.

In the wake of the ethnic disturbances of 1989, the League experienced serious difficulties in its efforts to remain a viable and independent human rights organization. On May 3, 1989, League Director Ghali Guld Abdel Hamid was arrested for "threatening state security" at Nouakchott airport after he publicly faulted the Governments of Senegal and Mauritania for failing to address ethnic problems. Ghali was released after 34 hours of detention.

In the weeks following Ghali's arrest, the League continued to speak out on the subject of human rights abuses, and on July 21, 1989, issued a statement critical of government expulsions of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians. The League continued to face considerable pressure from the Government, however, and on July 31, 1989, issued a statement critical of AI's declaration condemning Mauritania's expulsions of its citizens.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

Mauritania is situated geographically and culturally on the divide between traditionally nomadic Arabic-speaking Maurs of the north and the sedentary black cultivators of the African south. The interaction of these two groups produces the complex cultural diversity as well as the ethnic tensions inherent in Mauritanian society. Historically, the Hassaniya-speaking white Maurs have dominated the political and economic system. Taken together, the Hassaniya-speaking black Maurs--members of the former slave caste--and Mauritania's non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks outnumber the white Maurs by a considerable majority. This racial majority is by no means cohesive, however, since black Maurs identify in many ways more closely with the white Maur population.

Many non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians have long contended that since independence, white Maur domination in government, state enterprises, business, and religious institutions is a result of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Their grievances have included a reduction of the numbers of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians at all levels of government, and the increasing use of Hassaniya rather than French in many sectors of Mauritanian government and business. They have also pointed to the Government's new land reform law as a means to allow white and black Maurs to take control of fertile land in the Senegal river valley that had been traditionally the preserve of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians. Recent movements of nomads into the Senegal river valley as a result of the decade-long drought in the north further exacerbated tensions.

The violence in April that resulted in many deaths was in general more the result of an eruption of underlying ethnic tensions rather than an officially sanctioned government policy, but the expulsions of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians that followed were largely orchestrated by Mauritanian security forces.

Both white and black Maurs were resettled into the villages in the Senegal river valley from which Halpulaar residents were

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forcibly expelled. While many of those resettled were themselves refugees from Senegal, others had moved from northern Mauritania in search of richer farmlands. These resettlements have set the stage for future disputes over land tenure and a continuation of ethnic tensions in the Senegal river valley.

Women in Mauritanian Muslim society are often limited to traditional roles, which may encompass considerable financial and civil autonomy, especially outside the few urban areas. The Government is encouraging the entry of women into the professions, government, and business. In late 1988, the Taya Government created a new Ministry of Women's Affairs, Arts, and Tourism, and appointed a woman as the first Minister. The Government has also been instrumental in opening up new opportunities for employment traditionally reserved for men, such as in hospital work. According to Mauritanian law, men and women must receive equal pay for equal work, and Mauritania's two largest employers, the civil service and the state mining company SNIM, respect this law. In smaller private enterprises, wages are often determined by informal bargaining, leading to sometimes significant discrepancies in what two persons are paid for the same work.

While data are very limited, violence against women does not appear to be prevalent in Mauritania. Female genital mutilation (circumcision) is a widespread, traditional practice. The Government has taken no position nor issued any statements on violence against women or on genital mutilation. In some areas of southern Mauritania, the most extreme form of mutilation, infibulation, is practiced. Some evidence indicates that the incidence of female excision is diminishing in the modern, urbanized sector, and for an Islamic country, women are allowed a relatively great degree of freedom.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Workers are free to establish unions at the local and national level. There are currently 36 trade unions in the country. All, however, must be affiliates of the Union of Mauritanian Workers (UTM), by law the country's only central labor organization. The trade unions and the UTM elect their leadership democratically, and they are free to determine their programs and policies, provided these avoid political issues. The UTM is an active member of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.

Mauritanian law grants workers the right to strike. In practice, however, the Government discourages strikes, and they rarely occur. Under Mauritanian law, tripartite arbitration committees, composed of union, business, and government representatives, may impose binding arbitration that automatically terminates any strike.

In recent years, the UTM had been paralyzed by bitter factional disputes. In early 1989, elections and a national congress were held, and a new leadership moved quickly to revitalize the UTM. It did not, however, voice any opposition to the Government's dismissal of numerous non-Hassaniya-speaking black civil servants that occurred after April.

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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Unions are free to organize workers without government or employer interference. According to the UTM, close to 90 percent of industrial and commercial workers in Mauritania are members of unions. The laws providing worker's protection against antiunion discrimination are regularly enforced. Collective bargaining, notably to set wages, occurs informally between individual unions and employers but also involves the Government and the UTM. In addition, employees or employers may bring labor disputes to three-person labor courts that are overseen jointly by the Ministries of Justice and Labor. Labor leaders regard these courts as unbiased and effective. There are no export processing zones in Mauritania, and labor laws are applied uniformly throughout the country.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The subject of forced labor is tied to the vestiges of slavery which exist in some areas of Mauritania. Slavery was abolished officially only in 1980, and some persons whose ancestors had worked without pay for generations for a particular family still occupied positions of servitude in 1989. This was due in part to the economic hardships they would have encountered if they had left. There were reports, however, that in some remote areas persons were sometimes held against their will and forced to perform unpaid labor. The authorities stop such practices when they come to their attention. The Taya regime is making a systematic effort to appoint members of the former slave caste to high government and military positions as a visible indication of the end of slavery.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

Education is not compulsory in Mauritania, but Mauritanian law specifies that no child may be employed before the age of 13 in the agricultural sector without the permission of the Minister of Labor, nor before the age of 15 in the nonagricultural sector. The law provides that employed children aged 14 through 16 should receive 70 percent of the minimum wage, and those from 17 through 18 should receive 90 percent of the minimum wage. In practice, much younger children in the countryside pursue herding, cultivation, and other significant labor in support of their families' traditional activities. Although there are no data available, child labor in the nonagricultural sector is not widespread.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

In 1989 the guaranteed minimum wage for adults was equivalent to roughly $70 per month. These wages barely enabled the average family to meet its minimum needs. The standard, nonagricultural workweek in Mauritania cannot exceed either 40 hours or 6 days without overtime compensation, which is paid at the following rates: 41-48 hours--115 percent; 49-54 hours--140 percent; 55 plus hours--150 percent of the base wage. Reliable data on actual wage levels is scanty and unreliable. Enforcement of the labor laws, the responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, Ministry of Labor, is limited by the shortage of qualified personnel.

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THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND PEACE INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Note verbale dated 23 April 1990 from the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit to him the following documents:

(a) The definitive cease-fire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the YATAMA Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance under the auspices of His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo (see annex I);

(b) The effective and definitive cease-fire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance under the auspices of His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo (see annex II);

(c) The addendum to the Toncontín Agreement (see annex III).

We should be grateful if you would have the present note and its annexes circulated as an official document of the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

ANNEX I

Definitive cease-fire agreement between the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance under the auspices of His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo

1. The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua, duly represented by General Humberto Ortega Saavedra, and, for the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance, Commander Osorno Colleman agree to establish formally by means of the present document, with effect from 00.00 hours on the 20th day of the month of April 1990, a definitive cease-fire which shall be strictly observed by both parties.

2. With effect from the date of the definitive cease-fire, the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertake to cease all forms of military hostilities as well as all other types of operations that might lead to a renewal of hostilities.

3. In order to ensure strict observance of the cease-fire, the personnel of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo shall verify effective observance of the cease-fire.

In order to make it possible for the cease-fire to be verified by the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and by His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, "security zones" shall be established. See annex 1.

4. Both the United Nations Observer Group in Central America and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo shall make the necessary arrangements for verification of the cease-fire.

5. The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertakes on 25 April 1990 to withdraw its military, paramilitary and security forces from the "security zones" and from all adjacent localities within 10 kilometres of the borders of the said zones. Once the withdrawal of these forces has been completed, the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertakes not to mobilize any member of its military, paramilitary or security forces within 10 kilometres around the "security zones" and not to permit its military aircraft and helicopters to overfly the said zones.

The withdrawal of these forces from the "security zones" and the adjacent areas shall be verified by ONUCA and by His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who shall also monitor the relocation of the said forces to other localities.

6. With effect from the date of this Agreement, all members of the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance present in Nicaragua shall proceed without delay to the "security zones" to carry out the various stages of demobilization.

7. The military, paramilitary and security forces of the Government of Nicaragua shall facilitate the unimpeded passage of members of the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance proceeding to the "security zones".

8. Communication and mobility from one zone to another shall be authorized under the co-ordination of ONUCA.

9. The Government of Nicaragua undertakes to respect the liberty, security and physical and moral integrity of the members of the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance and of their family members.

10. CIAV shall transport and deliver humanitarian assistance to the members of the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their family members in the "security zones".

11. The general services normally provided in the "security zones" and their environs shall continue to be provided.

12. The Government of Nicaragua and the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance shall co-operate with CIAV and ONUCA in the performance of their functions.

13. The Government of Nicaragua undertakes to clear the mines from the frontier areas of Río Coco and Bismona mined by the Sandinist People's Army. The "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance undertakes to provide all information in its possession regarding zones which it knows to be mined. The military authorities shall indicate the routes from which mines have been cleared for their use in the unimpeded passage of members of "YATAMA" and their family members.

His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, under whose auspices the present Agreement is concluded, has agreed solemnly to proclaim this bilateral cease-fire as well as to co-operate and assist to the fullest of his ability in the disarmament, the verification of the effective and definitive cease-fire between the parties, the monitoring of the designated "security zones" in which the armed forces of the "YATAMA" Atlantic Front of the Nicaraguan Resistance will assemble and any other tasks of a humanitarian and social nature deriving from the above-mentioned activities.

Finally, His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo expresses his satisfaction at the patriotic decisions taken and joins with the signatories in giving thanks to the Lord for His assistance in opening the eyes of the contending parties.

For their part the undersigned, on behalf of and representing President-Elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, endorse the present definitive Cease-fire Agreement in its entirety, and pledge to observe it strictly as from 25 April 1990.

DONE in the city of Managua this 18th day of the month of April 1990.

(Signed)

OSORNO COLLEMAN
Commander and Chief of the
"YATAMA" Atlantic Front of
the Nicaraguan Resistance

(Signed)

MIGUEL CARDINAL OBANDO Y BRAVO

(Signed)

HUMBERTO ORTEGA SAAVEDRA
General
Government of the Republic
of Nicaragua

(Signed)

ANTONIO LACAYO
Representative of the elected
Government of Nicaragua

Annex 1

The present annex forms an integral part of the Cease-fire Agreement.

1. Security areas 1 and 2 shall be those indicated on the 1:1,000,000, 1:250,000 and 1:50,000 scale maps.

Annex 2

The present annex forms an integral part of the Cease-fire Agreement.

18 April

1. Signature of the definitive cease-fire.

23 April

1. Withdrawal of the concentration of the Sandinist People's Army and security forces from the security zones and adjacent areas.

Annex 3

25 April

1. YATAMA members begin to proceed from the banks of the Río Coco to security zone No. 1.

8 May

1. Installation of ONUCA observers to verify the cease-fire.

2. Arrival of the ONUCA contingent in the security zones.

3. Installation of CIAV in the security zones.

4. All YATAMA forces must be within the security zones.

18 May

1. Completion of demobilization in zones 1 and 2.

ANNEX II

Effective and Definitive Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance under the auspices of His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo

1. The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua, duly represented by the Minister of Defence, General Humberto Ortega Saavedra, and the Nicaraguan Resistance, duly represented by Oscar Sobalvarro "Commander Rubén", chief negotiator, and Aquilino Ruiz Robleto "Commander Minita", chief negotiator for the Wenceslao Aviles Central Front, agree to establish formally by means of the present document, with effect from 12 noon on the 19th day of the month of April 1990, an effective and definitive cease-fire, which shall be strictly observed by both parties.

2. With effect from the date of the effective and definitive cease-fire, the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertake to cease all forms of military hostilities as well as all other types of operation that might lead to a renewal of hostilities.

3. In order to ensure strict observance of this effective and definitive cease-fire, the personnel of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo shall verify effective observance of the cease-fire in accordance with the attached schedule.

4. In order to make it possible for the effective and definitive cease-fire to be verified by the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and by His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, "security zones" shall be established in the previously agreed areas, as noted in the Annex hereto.

5. Both the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo shall make the necessary arrangements for verification of the effective and definitive cease-fire.

6. The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertakes in the period from 19 to 21 April to withdraw its military, paramilitary and security forces from the "security zones" and from all adjacent localities within 20 kilometres of the borders of the said zones, save in those villages to be agreed on in each zone where a skeleton police force shall remain to maintain order, verified by ONUCA and Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and in the exclusion zones specified in the Act annexed hereto. Once the withdrawal of these forces has been completed, the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua undertakes not to mobilize any member of its military, paramilitary or security forces within 20 kilometres around the "security zones" and not to permit its military aircraft and helicopters to overfly the said zones, save in the corridors established in the Act annexed hereto.

7. The withdrawal of these forces from the "security zones" and from the adjacent areas shall be verified by ONUCA and by Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who shall also monitor the relocation of the said forces to other localities.

8. With effect from the date of this Agreement, all combatants of the Nicaraguan Resistance present in Nicaragua shall proceed without delay to the "security zones" to carry out the various stages of the demobilization process.

9. The military, paramilitary and security forces of the Government of Nicaragua shall not hinder the unimpeded passage of combatants of the Nicaraguan Resistance proceeding to the "security zones".

10. The leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance shall be authorized to communicate and to move from one zone to another, under the co-ordination of ONUCA.

11. The Government of Nicaragua undertakes to respect the liberty, security and physical and moral integrity of members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and of their family members.

12. CIAV shall transport and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance troops and their family members in the "security zones".

13. The general services normally provided in the "security zones" and their environs shall continue to be provided.

14. The Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance shall co-operate with CIAV, ONUCA and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo in the performance of their functions.

His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, under whose auspices the present Agreement is concluded, has agreed solemnly to proclaim this bilateral cease-fire as well as to co-operate and assist to the fullest of his ability in all stages of the demobilization process, the verification of the effective and definitive cease-fire between the parties, the monitoring of the designated "security zones" in which the armed forces of the Resistance will assemble and any other tasks of a humanitarian and social nature deriving from the above-mentioned activities.

Finally, His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo expresses his satisfaction at the patriotic decisions taken and joins with the signatories in giving thanks to the Lord for His assistance in opening the eyes of the contending parties.

DONE in the city of Managua this 18th day of the month of April 1990.

For the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua

(Signed)

General Humberto ORTEGA SAAVEDRA

For the Nicaraguan Resistance

(Signed)

Oscar SOBALVARRO
"Commander Rubén"

(Signed)

Aquilino RUIZ ROBLETO
"Commander Minita"

(Signed)

H.E. Miguel Cardinal OBANDO Y BRAVO

For their part, the undersigned, on behalf of and representing President-Elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, endorse the present effective and definitive Cease-fire Agreement in its entirety and pledge to observe it strictly as from 25 April 1990.

(Signed)

Antonio LACAYO

(Signed)

Carlos HURTADO

(Signed)

Luis SANCHEZ

(Signed)

Leopoldo NAVARRO

(Signed)

Roberto FERREY

ACT ESTABLISHING THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. "Demilitarized zone" shall mean that area lying within 20 kilometres of the security zone.

2. In the demilitarized zone, there shall be no artillery, no offensive troops of any kind, no militia and no paramilitary or security forces.

3. "Exclusion zone" shall mean, for verification purposes, the installations and brigade command posts which, being situated within 20 kilometres of the demilitarized zone, shall remain frozen under the supervision of ONUCA, one or two members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, the Sandinist People's Army and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo.

In zone No. 1 San Rafael and Las Cuchillas. In zone No. 2 Walala. In zone No. 3 Río Blanco. In zone No. 4 Santo Domingo. In zone No. 5 Nueva Guinea.

4. The police of the villages situated within the demilitarized zone shall be disarmed.

5. The following air corridors shall be established:

(a) Managua-Ocotal-Wiwili;

(b) Managua-San Pedro del Norte-Puerto Cabesas;

(c) Managua-Juigalpa-Bluefields;

(d) Managua-San Carlos-San Juan del Norte.

6. Co-ordination groups shall be established to solve the security problems, and shall co-ordinate, through ONUCA, the air and land traffic.

Annex

Schedule of activities to be carried out during the process of the demobilization of the resistance forces

No.	ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT	EFFECTIVE TIME-LIMIT TO BE OBSERVED
1.	Signing of the effective and definitive "Cease-fire" Agreement between the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance	18-04-90
2.	Entry into force of the cease-fire	19-04-90 12 noon
3.	Withdrawal of the military forces of the Sandinist People's Army, security forces and paramilitary forces from the "security zones" and adjacent localities	19-04-90 to 21-04-90
4.	Resistance forces begin to proceed to the "security zones"	19-04-90 after 12 noon

No.	ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT	EFFECTIVE TIME-LIMIT TO BE OBSERVED
5.	CIAV begins to distribute humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance troops located in the "security zones"	19-04-90 12 noon
6.	Verification of the withdrawal of troops of the Government of Nicaragua by ONUCA and by Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo	22-04-90
7.	Arrival in the country of the first United Nations peace-keeping forces (ONUCA)	22-04-90
8.	ONUCA proceeds to the "security zones"	22-04-90
9.	All Nicaraguan Resistance forces are assembled in the "security zones"	25-04-90

ANNEX III

Addendum to the Toncontín Agreement

The Negotiating Committee of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the delegation representing the President-Elect of Nicaragua, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, in view of the signing of the effective and definitive Cease-fire Agreement concluded this day between the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance, declare to the people of Nicaragua and to the international community the following:

1. That we are deeply pleased that voluntary disarmament of the Resistance forces still remaining in the Republic of Honduras has been achieved this day, in full compliance with the Toncontín Agreement, and that the effective and definitive Cease-fire Agreement has also been signed this day under the auspices of His Eminence Cardinal Obando y Bravo.

2. That, in order for the demobilization process to be carried out in a climate of security and order, which will safeguard life and ensure that the peaceful work of the members of the Resistance may proceed normally, we have agreed that the disarmament of the Resistance forces should commence on 25 April in the afternoon and that their full demobilization should be completed no later than 10 June 1990.

3. That the voluntary handing over of weapons shall, like that which took place today in the Republic of Honduras, take place in the presence of international bodies (ONUCA, CIAV) and His Eminence Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo.

For his part, His Eminence Cardinal Obando y Bravo expresses his satisfaction at the patriotic decisions taken and joins with the signatories in giving thanks to the Lord for His assistance in opening the eyes of the contending parties.

Managua, 18 April 1990

(Signed)

Oscar SAAVEDRA
"Commander Rubén"

(Signed)

Antonio LACAYO

(Signed)

H.E. Miguel Cardinal OBANDO Y BRAVO

UNITED
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Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 47
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 25 April 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 24 April 1990 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Özer Koray, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 47, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 24 April 1990 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government I would like to communicate the following in relation to the terrorists activities perpetrated in South Cyprus against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus:

In an interview published in the Greek Cypriot daily Alithia of 1 April 1990, Greek Cypriot political party leader, Mr. Glafkos Clerides noted that certain circles in the Greek Cypriot community believed that the framework for a Cyprus settlement could be changed and that all their efforts were directed towards bringing about this change. Mr. Clerides, referring to the recent explosion at the Omeriye Mosque in South Nicosia, revealed that the fuse used in detonating the bomb planted in that Mosque was of the same type that had been used to explode bombs soon after the election of the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. George Vassiliou, to provoke confrontation between the left and the right. Mr. Clerides further observed that the parts of the bomb which were found at the site of the explosion indicated that it was of the same type distributed to a number of Greek Cypriot National Guard units.

It was also reported in the Greek Cypriot press of 1 April 1990 that the Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior, Mr. Benjamin, referred to the presence of "illegal groups" in South Cyprus and confirmed their possession of a great number of weapons. Mr. Benjamin reportedly expressed the serious concern of his administration over this issue. Mr. Benjamin, in response to journalists' questions in connection with the weapons, illegal groups and their activities in South Cyprus, referred to a crime in Limassol and the bombing of the Omeriye Mosque and disclosed that a large number of weapons, numbering between 5,000-6,000, were in the hands of unauthorized persons in South Cyprus and that these weapons had been stolen from the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Cypriot Police Force armories during the Greek-engineered coup d'état of 1974. Though the number of weapons which made up the arms cache recently discovered in Larnaca by the Greek Cypriot police is negligible compared to the number of weapons in the hands of unauthorized groups, the cache's composition, nevertheless, clearly reveals the gravity of the situation prevailing South Cyprus.

The latest revelations by Greek Cypriot leaders in connection with the upsurge of terrorist activities in South Cyprus, and their nature, are serious matters which should be watched closely. According to these revelations, there are organized groups in South Cyprus who oppose any kind of negotiated settlement with the Turkish Cypriots and are instigating violence against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. These groups have shown that they can, and will, resort to terrorism in order to create tension and animosity in the island. One equally worrying aspect of the problem is that these groups are potentially capable of creating havoc on a large scale. Also, the discovery of Greek Cypriot National Guard weapons and equipment in the hands of such terrorist groups, have shown that the National Guard armories are, one way or another, easily accessible to these

groups. Though they still lack the necessary will and determination to combat it, and so far have taken no serious measures in this regard, the fact that even members of the Greek Cypriot administration are now expressing concern over the whole issue of terrorism, suffices to show that the potential threat of widespread violence in the island is highly significant.

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27 April 1990

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UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Report of the Secretary-General

Introduction

1. On 7 November 1989 the Security Council adopted resolution 644 (1989), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

> "1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/20895;
>
> "2. Decides to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Observer Group in Central America and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect in accordance with his above-mentioned report, bearing in mind the need to continue to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of increasing demands on peace-keeping resources;
>
> "3. Further decides that the United Nations Observer Group in Central America shall be established for a period of six months, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
>
> "4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments."

2. The original mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was based on a series of requests by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, was to conduct on-site verification of the undertakings in respect of security contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement (S/19085, annex), namely (a) the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements and (b) the non-use of the territory of one State for attacks on other States. As indicated in paragraph 1 above, that mandate, which was described in detail in my report to the Security Council of 11 October 1989 (S/20895, paras. 5 and 8), was approved by the Council in resolution 644 (1989).

3. On 27 March 1990, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 650 (1990), decided to authorize, on a contingency basis in accordance with proposals contained in a report which I had submitted to the Council on 15 March 1990 (S/21194), an enlargement of the mandate of ONUCA and the addition of armed personnel to its strength in order to enable it to play a part in the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance.

4. Subsequently, following the signature in Managua on 18 April 1990 of a series of agreements setting out modalities for the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 653 (1990) of 20 April 1990, approved my proposals (S/21257 and S/21259) concerning the addition of new tasks to ONUCA's mandate, as requested by the Nicaraguan parties. These additional functions related to the monitoring of the cease-fire that had come into effect in Nicaragua on 19 April 1990 and the separation of forces expected to result from the withdrawal of Nicaraguan government forces from certain "security zones" that had been established in that country to facilitate the demobilization. In the same resolution the Security Council requested me to report to the Council on all aspects of ONUCA's operations before the expiry of the current mandate period on 7 May 1990.

5. The present report contains an account of ONUCA's operations and related developments since the arrival of the advance party in Honduras on 2 December 1989 and the establishment of a temporary headquarters at Tegucigalpa. An addendum covering the latest developments will be submitted to the Council in time for its consideration of the recommendation contained in the present report.

Command, composition and deployment

6. ONUCA is under the command of the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Agustín Quesada Gomez (Spain) (see S/20981 and S/20982).

7. As of 27 April 1990, the military strength of ONUCA was 995, made up as follows:

United Nations military observers	
Canada	34
Colombia	12
Ecuador	21
Ireland	31
Spain	49
Venezuela	22
Total	169
Other military personnel	
Venezuela	702
Air unit	
Canada	124
Total	995

In addition to the above, six civilian medical officers, seven medical assistants and three pilots provided by the Federal Republic of Germany have assisted ONUCA from the beginning of its mission.

8. A total of 64 military observers from Brazil, India and Sweden are expected to arrive in the mission area in the coming days and there will be further additions to ONUCA's military strength when the crews of the four patrol boats provided by Argentina (see S/21232 and S/21233) arrive in a few weeks' time.

9. One hundred and seventy-four staff members - 85 of whom are international staff and 89 recruited locally - are in the mission area at present. In addition, there are 10 civilian aircrew and maintenance personnel for 4 medium helicopters chartered from a commercial firm. The Secretariat has proceeded prudently in filling the international posts authorized for ONUCA to meet operational needs as these have arisen. Although the number of locally recruited staff has now reached the maximum authorized, there is a need for additional local posts in many areas.

10. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, ONUCA began its activities in the region on 2 December 1989 with the arrival of an advance party in Honduras. As anticipated in the original concept of operations, General Quesada has since established ONUCA's headquarters in the Honduran capital and five liaison offices, headed by officers in the rank of colonel, have been established in the capitals of the five countries concerned. The Tegucigalpa liaison office is temporarily co-located with the Group's headquarters. In addition, verification centres, each with a strength of up to 10 observers, have been set up in 13 localities, including the 5 capitals. Two operational posts have also been established in Honduras and one in Nicaragua.

11. The table below shows the deployment of ONUCA as at 27 April 1990.

	Liaison offices	Verification centres	Operational posts
Costa Rica	San José	San José El Platanar	
El Salvador	San Salvador	San Salvador	
Guatemala	Guatemala City	Guatemala City Esquipulas	
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	Tegucigalpa Choluteca Danli Santa Rosa	Las Trojes Mocoron
Nicaragua	Managua	Managua Esteli Ocotal Chinandega	El Tanque

The deployment of ONUCA as of April 1990 is shown in the annexed map.

/...

Operations

12. ONUCA's original mandate, as approved by the Security Council in resolution 644 (1989) of 7 November 1989, was to verify compliance by the five Central American Governments with the undertakings in respect of security contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement, namely cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements operating in the region and the non-use of the territory of one State for attacks on others (see para. 2 above). In order to carry out that mandate, I recommended that ONUCA should be deployed in phases, as stated in paragraph 23 of my report of 11 October 1989 to the Security Council (S/20895).

13. The timetable for deployment of the first three phases was in general adhered to, with the advance party arriving in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on 2 December 1989 (D-5), phase II being completed by 18 January 1990 (D+42) and phase III by 4 March 1990 (D+89). It did not however prove possible to deploy the full complement of personnel and equipment envisaged for phases II and III. There were two main reasons for this. First, some of the troop-contributing Governments found themselves unable to provide all the military observers requested of them; this problem is now on the way to being solved (see para. 14 below). Secondly, it proved unexpectedly difficult to find a Member State able to supply the four fast patrol boats, together with their crews, required for patrolling the Gulf of Fonseca; this problem has now been solved with the assistance of Argentina, as reported in my letter of 29 March 1990 to the President of the Security Council (S/21232). It has been decided that the patrol boats will be based at San Lorenzo, Honduras.

14. In my report of 11 October 1989 (S/20895, para. 23 (d)), I recommended that the timing of phase IV of ONUCA's deployment should be determined in the light of the progress and results achieved during the first three phases and other relevant factors. On 15 March 1990 I reported to the Security Council (S/21194, para. 9) that I believed that the implementation of phase IV should begin as soon as possible. The Security Council approved that report in its resolution 650 (1990) of 27 March 1990. Four additional Member States (Brazil, Ecuador, India and Sweden) agreed to contribute military observers and a reply is awaited from a fifth (S/21261). With these additional contributions it will be possible during the coming days to raise ONUCA's strength of military observers to the 260 originally mandated by resolution 644 (1989).

15. Liaison offices and verification centres were established in the capitals of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua during phase I, as planned. In El Salvador, however, it was necessary, for security reasons, to delay ONUCA's deployment in San Salvador until 17 January 1990.

16. Under the concept of operations described in my report of 11 October 1989 (S/20895, para. 12), ONUCA was to verify the five Governments' compliance with the security undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement by means of mobile teams of military observers working from verification centres "located as close as possible to sensitive areas where violations of the undertakings ... might be most likely to occur but taking into account the situation on the ground, the security of the military observers and their need for tolerable living conditions". Possible

locations for such verification centres in each of the five countries had been identified by the reconnaissance mission that was dispatched to the area in September 1989.

17. In further reconnaissance after ONUCA's deployment, the Chief Military Observer decided that some of those locations should be revised, given the nature of the terrain and the existing road networks, most of which run in a north-south direction and do not therefore facilitate lateral movement along the borders. General Quesada concluded that better results would be achieved by establishing fewer and larger verification centres at a greater distance from the sensitive areas, with smaller operational posts, manned on a rotational basis, being established in forward areas where living conditions are difficult. This revised concept has produced satisfactory results and will be further developed following the deployment of phase IV. It explains why the number of verification centres so far established by ONUCA is fewer than envisaged in my report of 11 October 1989.

18. In other respects, the verification centres have operated in the manner foreseen in that report, with those in the capitals providing a reserve of mobile teams when short-notice verification is required. Patrolling has been carried out daily by land and air and occasionally by river. It has been concentrated in those areas where activities that may be contrary to the security undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement are most frequently alleged to occur. These are the areas adjacent to the borders between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, between Honduras and Nicaragua, between Honduras and El Salvador and between Guatemala and El Salvador, together with the north-eastern part of Nicaragua and the south-western part of Honduras. ONUCA's patrols have confirmed that in many of these areas the nature of the terrain is such that it is very difficult for the local authorities to prevent, and for international observers to detect, clandestine movement of armed personnel and military supplies across the borders. Vegetation is dense, metalled roads are few and far between, earth roads become impassable during the rainy season and many of the border areas are believed to be mined. While specific breaches of the security undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement have not been directly observed by ONUCA patrols, cross-border movements have undoubtedly taken place during the period under review, especially a major movement of members of the Nicaraguan resistance from Honduras into Nicaragua during March and early April.

19. Subject to the Security Council's renewal of its mandate, ONUCA will maintain and enlarge its patrolling programme during the coming months. This will be facilitated by the additional military observers who will become available under phase IV, as soon as the officers concerned can be released from the temporary duties to which they will be initially assigned (see para. 26 below).

20. As foreseen in my report of 11 October 1989 (S/20895, para. 19), ONUCA has maintained informal contacts with the principal irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region, namely the Nicaraguan resistance and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) of El Salvador. The purpose of these contacts has been to seek the two groups' co-operation in facilitating the implementation of ONUCA's mandate and to ensure that no threat is presented by either of them to the security of ONUCA personnel. Both groups have expressed reservations about ONUCA's original mandate, which they see as being

directed against their interests. In the case of the Nicaraguan resistance it was only in early March that ONUCA began to obtain access to their camps in Honduras. This problem was, however, resolved after agreement was reached on the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance. For its part, FMLN has assured the Chief Military Observer that all its personnel have received orders not to undertake any hostile action against ONUCA verification centres or patrols and has suggested certain steps which ONUCA can take (and has taken) to reduce the risk of accidental confrontations. The hostilities in El Salvador have, nevertheless, limited ONUCA's ability to patrol in that country and no verification centre has so far been set up outside the capital.

21. As envisaged in paragraph 11 (c) of my report of 11 October 1989 (S/20895), ONUCA has received and investigated complaints from two of the five Governments about alleged violations of the security undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement. In each case the complaint was communicated to the Government complained against, which was asked to extend to ONUCA the co-operation needed to enable it to investigate the complaint. The details are as follows:

(a) On 18 January 1990, the Chief Military Observer received a letter from the Nicaraguan authorities complaining about the alleged presence of members of the Nicaraguan resistance on Costa Rican territory close to the border between the two countries on 12 and 14 January 1990. The Nicaraguan authorities also addressed this complaint directly to the Costa Rican authorities which, having carried out their own investigation, informed ONUCA that no evidence had been found to substantiate the Nicaraguan complaint and that the Joint Border Commission set up by the two countries was continuing to function well;

(b) On 15 March 1990 the Chief Military Observer received a letter from the Salvadorian authorities alleging the presence on Nicaraguan territory of:

(i) A radio transmitter used for military purposes by FMLN;

(ii) An FMLN command post;

(iii) A garage used for the construction of secret compartments in vehicles for smuggling arms into El Salvador;

(iv) A printing press used for FMLN propaganda.

ONUCA immediately began to monitor the radio frequency complained about; apart from one transmission of coded material on 19 March 1990, nothing was heard. On 4 April 1990 ONUCA transmitted the Salvadorian complaint to the Nicaraguan authorities and sought their co-operation in obtaining access to the buildings that were the subject of the complaints referred to in subparagraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv) above. Access was obtained on 7 April. Nothing was found at any of the three sites to substantiate the Salvadorian complaint. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the two Governments concerned.

(c) On 11 April 1990, the Chief Military Observer received a letter dated 9 April 1990 from the Salvadorian authorities alleging the existence of two FMLN

"safe houses" in Managua, one of which was allegedly used as a command post. The complaint was transmitted to the Nicaraguan authorities on 16 April 1990 and ONUCA obtained access to the two properties three hours later. Nothing was found in either to substantiate the Salvadorian complaint. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the two Governments concerned.

22. One other incident merits mention in this context. On 10 April 1990, ONUCA learnt from the media that three days previously the Honduran authorities had intercepted, close to that country's border with El Salvador, a truck in which arms and explosives had been hidden. The Honduran authorities have been asked to ensure that in any future such incident ONUCA should be given immediate access so that it will be in a position to verify whether or not a breach has occurred of the security undertakings contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement.

23. Developments in Nicaragua, following the elections there on 25 February, have brought about two enlargements of ONUCA's mandate during recent weeks. Given the desire of all the parties concerned in Nicaragua that ONUCA should be responsible for the military aspects of implementation of the Tela Accord for the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance, I submitted my report of 15 March 1990 (S/21194) to the Security Council. In that report I sought the Council's urgent approval, on a contingency basis, for an enlargement of ONUCA's mandate and the addition of armed personnel to its strength so that it could take part in the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance. The purpose of that request was to ensure that I would be in a position to deploy the required personnel and material resources to the area as soon as the necessary political conditions were fulfilled, namely an agreement by all concerned on the voluntary demobilization. In its resolution 650 (1990) of 27 March 1990 the Security Council approved that report and gave me the requested authority. The Venezuelan Government agreed to make available an infantry battalion and hold it on stand-by, pending the achievement of the necessary political agreement.

24. On 5 April 1990, I was able to report to the Security Council that agreement had been reached on the demobilization of the two principal groups of the Nicaraguan resistance remaining in Honduras on 16 and 18 April respectively; I had accordingly requested the Government of Venezuela to make available the first company of its battalion for deployment to the region. That company arrived in Honduras on 10 April 1990. On 16 April it demobilized 260 members of the Atlantic Front (Yatama) of the Nicaraguan resistance at La Kiatara in eastern Honduras and destroyed their weapons and military equipment. At their summit at Montelimar, Nicaragua, on 3 April 1990, the five Central American Presidents had agreed to my proposal that the weapons and other equipment received from the members of the Nicaraguan resistance should be destroyed by ONUCA. On 18 April, at the main Nicaraguan resistance camp at Yamales in Honduras, large quantities of weapons, most of them obsolete and unserviceable, were handed over to ONUCA for destruction. In the event, no personnel were demobilized on this occasion as all active combatants previously located at Yamales had apparently left for Nicaragua or other destinations.

25. Meanwhile, intensive negotiations were taking place between the Nicaraguan Government, representatives of the President-elect and the leadership of the

Nicaraguan resistance, with the participation of the Archbishop of Managua, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, in order to reach agreement on modalities for the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance inside Nicaragua. The Chief Military Observer of ONUCA and my Alternate Personal Representative for the Central American peace process took an active part in these negotiations. I had instructed them to emphasize my concern that the demobilization should be genuine, in the sense that each combatant would voluntarily hand over his or her weapon, and that there should be an agreed timetable for the completion of demobilization.

26. As reported earlier (see para. 4 above), on the night of 18-19 April the Nicaraguan parties, in the presence of my representatives, signed a complex of agreements relating to the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance during the period from 25 April to 10 June 1990. As a result they requested that ONUCA should monitor both a cease-fire that came into effect at 12 noon local time on 19 April and the separation of forces that would result from the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government's forces from certain "security zones" which were to be established in Nicaragua to facilitate the demobilization. On this basis, I sought the Security Council's approval of a further enlargement of ONUCA's mandate to cover these functions (S/21257 and S/21259). That approval was granted by resolution 653 (1990) on the following day.

27. At the time of writing, ONUCA has only just begun to monitor the cease-fire and the separation of forces inside Nicaragua. I accordingly intend to present to the Security Council, shortly before the expiry of the present mandate on 7 May 1990, an addendum to the present report containing an up-to-date account of ONUCA's performance of these functions and of the progress of demobilization.

Relations with the parties

28. As with all peace-keeping operations, an essential condition for ONUCA's ability to fulfil its mandate is that it should receive the full co-operation of the parties, especially as regards the freedom of movement and communications and other facilities needed to carry out its duties. It will be clear from the preceding sections of the present report that the five Governments concerned have extended excellent co-operation to ONUCA, although in some cases some practical questions remain to be resolved. In this respect, it is hoped that those Governments that have not yet found it possible to do so will soon be in a position to accept the proposals that I made last November, in the form of an exchange of letters, concerning the status of ONUCA in each of the five Central American countries.

Financial aspects

29. By its resolution 44/44 of 7 December 1989, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of ONUCA at a rate not to exceed $4,524,100 gross ($4,389,500 net) per month, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), for the 12-month period beginning 7 May 1990, should the Security Council decide to renew the mandate of ONUCA beyond the period of 6 months authorized under its resolution 644 (1989). If the Council decides to extend ONUCA beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Group during the extension period will be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 44/44. As regards the costs resulting from the enlargement of the mandate of ONUCA and the addition of armed personnel to its strength, the necessary commitment authority is being sought from ACABQ.

30. As at 24 April 1990 unpaid assessed contributions to the ONUCA Special Account amounted to approximately $2.6 million.

Observations

31. Although ONUCA was initially established with the limited mandate of verifying only one aspect of the Central American peace process, it was from the beginning my hope that it would evolve incrementally and that the very presence of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in the area would encourage the five Central American Governments to ask the Security Council to give ONUCA additional functions as the peace process developed. As the members of the Security Council are aware, this is what has happened. During the first six months of ONUCA's existence, its mandate has twice been enlarged to enable it to play a part in assisting the parties concerned to control and resolve the complex of conflicts which have plagued the region for too long. It is my earnest hope that, as foreseen in the statement issued at Geneva on 4 April 1990, I will before long approach the Council regarding the monitoring of a cessation of the armed confrontation in El Salvador.

32. It is equally, of course, my hope that ONUCA's mandate will from time to time be adjusted as tasks assigned to it evolve. For instance, the Nicaraguan parties concerned have agreed that the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance should be completed by 10 June 1990. This agreement, of which the Security Council took specific note in its resolution 653 (1990), clearly implies that ONUCA's tasks related to the cease-fire and demobilization will also be completed by that date. It is therefore my intention to repatriate the Venezuelan battalion in mid-June, which will accord with the time-scale envisaged in paragraph 12 of my report of 15 March 1990 (S/21194).

33. The view has also been expressed that recent and prospective developments in Central America, notably the elections in Nicaragua, the imminent demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance and the early start of talks under my auspices between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN, have rendered obsolete ONUCA's original mandate to verify the five Governments' compliance with their

undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks against neighbouring States. I share the hope that this task will soon become unnecessary. But I hesitate to recommend that the Council delete it from ONUCA's mandate at the present stage. I believe that the above-mentioned developments need to be followed up and consolidated and that more time is required to assess the consequences of what has happened and is happening in Central America. It would be prudent therefore to leave ONUCA's mandate and military observer strength unchanged for the time being. I am strengthened in this belief by recent consultations with the five Central American Governments, all of which have expressed the wish that on this occasion the Security Council should extend ONUCA's mandate in its present form.

34. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council extend ONUCA's mandate, as defined in resolutions 644 (1989), 650 (1990) and 653 (1990), for a further period of six months. This recommendation is made on the understanding that, in accordance with the agreements signed by the Nicaraguan parties concerned, ONUCA's tasks of monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces in Nicaragua and demobilizing members of the Nicaraguan resistance will lapse with the completion of the demobilization process not later than 10 June 1990 and that shortly thereafter the Venezuelan battalion will be repatriated. I shall present a progress report to the Security Council at that time. I shall also, of course, inform the Council immediately if, at any other time, a change in ONUCA's mandate appears to be called for.

35. Finally, I should like to pay tribute to the Chief Military Observer of ONUCA, Major-General Agustín Quesada Gomez, and to all the men and women under his command, both military and civilian, for the part that they have played in establishing ONUCA. Despite the uncertainties and shortages that accompany the start of any peace-keeping operation, they have shown great skill and determination in establishing ONUCA's operations in the five countries where it is deployed, as well as great flexibility in responding to two successive enlargements of its mandate. Their performance of their duties has reflected great credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



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APRIL 1990

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/21274/Add.1
2 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. As promised in my report to the Security Council of 27 April 1990 (S/21274, paras. 5 and 27), the present addendum is intended to provide the Council with an up-to-date account of the manner in which the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) has carried out its functions relating to the monitoring of the cease-fire and the separation of forces in Nicaragua, as well as of the status of the demobilization process.

2. Pursuant to the complex of agreements concluded between the Nicaraguan parties at Managua during the night of 18-19 April 1990, five "security zones" were established on 22 April following the withdrawal of the Nicaraguan Government's forces from the areas in question during the preceding three days. Within each zone, ONUCA personnel has been deployed in a "demobilization and logistics support area" (DLSA), where it is envisaged that the hand-over of weapons and other activities connected with the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance will be completed. The table below shows the approximate size of each "security zone", the location of the corresponding DLSA and the numbers of unarmed ONUCA observers and armed members of the Venezuelan battalion present in each zone at 1 May 1990.

Security zone	Approximate size (km^2)	DLSA	ONUCA strength	
			United Nations military observers	Venezuelan battalion
1	554	El Amparo	9	103
2	602	Kubalí	9	61
3	500	San Andres de Boboke	9	135
4	609	La Piñuela-El Ayote	9	144
5	576	El Almendro	9	143

3. The zones are generally very sparsely populated and are crossed by only one or two dirt roads. With the exception of zone 4, which is in a valley, all are in mountainous and wooded areas. Whereas road conditions and other facilities vary widely among them, all five offer to varying degrees the infrastructure necessary to enable ONUCA to carry out its tasks.

4. The headquarters of the Venezuelan battalion has been established at Matagalpa, some 100 km north of Managua and outside the "security zones". It has a total strength of 102. The Central Command of the Nicaraguan resistance is currently located at El Destino in zone 1.

5. As envisaged under the Managua agreements of 18-19 April, each "security zone" is surrounded by a "demilitarized zone" of some 20 km in width. The exact delineation of the "demilitarized zones" surrounding zones 1, 2, 3 and 4 has already been agreed upon by the parties; discussions concerning the delineation of the fifth are still in progress.

6. Within each of the "demilitarized zones", one or two installations of the Nicaraguan Government's forces have been designated as "exclusion zones" (zonas de exclusión). These installations, from which government forces have been withdrawn, are supervised jointly by one or two members of each of the Nicaraguan parties, as well as by representatives of ONUCA and of Cardinal Obando y Bravo.

7. As foreseen in a separate agreement signed on 18 April 1990 with representatives of the Misquitian branch of the Nicaraguan resistance known as "Yatama", two additional zones have been established on the Atlantic coast, within which demobilization of the "Yatama" is due to start on 8 May 1990. These zones cover a total area of approximately 2,550 km^2. They are located in the extreme north-east between the towns of Waspam and Laguna Bismuna and along the banks of the Prinzapolka River, respectively. Adjacent to each of these zones there is also a "demilitarized zone". ONUCA will deploy there before 8 May.

8. As soon as the cease-fire came into effect at 12 noon on 19 April 1990, liaison arrangements, operating on a 24-hour basis, were set up by ONUCA with both the Nicaraguan Government's forces and the Nicaraguan resistance. In addition, ONUCA observer teams were dispatched to each "security zone" to investigate immediately, should the need arise, any breaches of the cease-fire, and to carry out road and helicopter patrols within the zones as a confidence-building measure. While some minor incidents have occurred since the cease-fire came into effect, neither Nicaraguan party has reported incidents which have subsequently been confirmed as violations of the cease-fire agreement.

9. In accordance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement, Nicaraguan Government forces were withdrawn to positions outside the "demilitarized zones" during the period 19-21 April, having disarmed Nicaraguan militia units which were present in the zones. As a result of this and the accompanying concentration of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance within the "security zones", a separation of forces is being achieved. Few problems have occurred in connection with the establishment of the separation of forces, which is closely monitored by ONUCA. At present, ONUCA carries out patrols by road and air to monitor the continuing separation of forces.

10. The agreements signed at Managua on 18-19 April provided that the voluntary demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance deployed inside Nicaragua would commence on 25 April and be completed at the latest by 10 June 1990. Whereas all the necessary arrangements had been made by ONUCA, in co-ordination with representatives of the Nicaraguan resistance, for demobilization to begin in zone 1 at 1500 hours on 25 April, those members of the resistance who had assembled there for this purpose declined to lay down their weapons after listening to a declaration by their commander (comandante) stating his view that the minimum conditions for demobilization had not been met. Representatives of the Government of Nicaragua and of Cardinal Obando y Bravo were also present on this occasion and addressed the members of the Nicaraguan resistance, urging them to proceed with the demobilization. Subsequently, the commander of the Nicaraguan resistance concerned requested a meeting at Managua with representatives of the Government in order to discuss the start of demobilization. At the time of writing, it was envisaged that such a meeting might be held at Managua in the coming days. Meanwhile, ONUCA remains ready to carry out its responsibilities in connection with the demobilization as soon as it gets under way.

11. In Honduras, the national army deployed a battalion in the Yamales valley on 27 April in order to take up positions along the border with Nicaragua.. It is expected that demobilization of any individual members of the Nicaraguan resistance remaining in Yamales and other locations along the border will commence in the near future.

Observations

12. It is a matter of grave concern that the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance did not begin in the afternoon of 25 April, as stipulated in the agreements signed at Managua on 18-19 April. It has always been intended that the role of ONUCA in this process should be to help ensure the speedy return of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance to civilian life and not to assist them in establishing armed camps for an indefinite period of time on Nicaraguan territory. This point was emphasized by my representatives to all the Nicaraguan participants in the negotiations on 18-19 April and it was on this basis, and on the strength of the agreements signed on that occasion, that I recommended to the Security Council that ONUCA should play the part requested of it in monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces. I believe that serious efforts must now be made by all concerned in order to get the demobilization process quickly back on track. This can only be done if the solemn commitments contained in the Managua agreements are scrupulously honoured.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/21275
26 April 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on 7 April 1990, an Iraqi boat violating the terms of cease-fire entered the restricted zone at 73200-72000 on the map of Khorramshahr for reconnaissance purposes. The Iraqi boat was spotted by Iranian forces and it did not retreat until warning shots were fired.

Such Iraqi violations of cease-fire are extremely provocative with possible serious consequences for which only the Iraqi side is to be held responsible.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
NATIONS

General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/258
S/21276
27 April 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 23, 35 and 77 of the
preliminary list* ,
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 27 April 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to bring the following to your immediate attention:

On Thursday, 26 April 1990, the first day of Eid El-Fitr Al Mubarak, the occupied Palestinian territory witnessed one of its bloodiest days as the Israeli army opened fire at Palestinian civilians, resulting in the killing of five persons and the wounding of hundreds more. The most criminal acts by the army took place in Jabalya refugee camp (Gaza) and Kabbatia (West Bank).

I also have to draw your attention to the fact that for the first time ever, all Christian churches and Holy places in the Holy Land are effectively closed as of 9:00 a.m. (Palestine time) today until tomorrow in protest to the illegal occupation by Jewish settlers of St. John's Hospice in the heart of the Christian quarter of Jerusalem.

This dangerous and deteriorating situation in the occupied Palestinian territory requires immediate actions by the international community, and especially the United Nations.

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* A/45/50.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 35 and 77 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Alternate Permanent Observer
of Palestine to the United Nations
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21277
27 April 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 APRIL 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire:

1. At 1030 hours on 1 April 1990, eight Iranians proceeded to dig a combat position at co-ordinates 175389, 1,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

2. At 1000 hours on 1 April 1990, three dump trucks were seen unloading earth on the road leading to the Iranian monitoring post in no man's land at co-ordinates 930971, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

3. At 0700 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer, eight dump trucks and five Iranian soldiers was seen carrying surveying equipment for the purpose of strengthening the road at co-ordinates 688151, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

4. At 0810 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and seven dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 555207, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

5. At 0910 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer, a roller and four dump trucks was seen carrying earth and raising the height of the embankment at co-ordinates 276667, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

6. At 1000 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer, a grader and three dump trucks was seen mending the road parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 409558, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

7. At 1020 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two excavators and four dump trucks was seen raising the height of the embankment at co-ordinates 421544, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

/...

8. At 1030 hours on 1 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and two dump trucks was seen levelling the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 355596, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

9. At 1600 hours on 2 April 1990, the Iranians built an observation post of sandbags at co-ordinates 519411, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

10. At 1720 hours on 2 April 1990, eight Iranians were seen fishing in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 545251, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

11. At 0950 hours on 2 April 1990, a roller was seen operating on the Iranian embankment between co-ordinates 367595 and 370595, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

12. At 1020 hours on 2 April 1990, an Iranian fork-lift was seen lifting three semicircular concrete shelter sections from the rear of the embankment and lowering them on the earthen rampart at co-ordinates 308594, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1135 hours on 2 April 1990, an Iranian truck was seen carrying four semicircular concrete shelter sections and a fork-lift, which lowered them to the rear of the forward embankment at co-ordinates 283689, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

14. At 1100 hours on 3 April 1990, the Iranians built a 16-metre-long blockhouse on the Iranian rampart at co-ordinates 926932, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

15. At 1130 hours on 3 April 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen strengthening the spit extending from the Iranian rampart to the Iranian ambush at co-ordinates 928971, 2,000 metres from our III Army Corps units.

16. At 1730 hours on 3 April 1990, four Iranians were seen building a guard post of sandbags at co-ordinates 519405, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

17. At 1100 hours on 3 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer and four dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 272699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

18. At 0815 hours on 4 April 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen strengthening the spit at co-ordinates 928971, 2,000 metres from our III Army Corps units.

19. At 0740 hours on 4 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 555209, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

20. At 1030 hours on 4 April 1990, two Iranians were seen building a 1.5-metre-high and 1-metre-wide observation post of sandbags at co-ordinates 519416, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

21. At 1030 hours on 4 April 1990, the Iranians built a circular position of sandbags at co-ordinates 516414, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

22. At 0950 hours on 4 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and three dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 409558, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

23. At 0955 hours on 4 April 1990, seven dump trucks were seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 429535, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

24. At 1000 hours on 4 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader, a bulldozer and two rollers was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 273698, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

25. At 1200 hours on 5 April 1990, three Iranians took photographs of our positions from the Iranian post at co-ordinates 610387, 100 metres from our II Army Corps units.

26. At 0900 hours on 5 April 1990, a fork-lift was seen lowering concrete shelter sections onto a truck at the Iranian monitoring post in no man's land at co-ordinates 922977. At 1030 hours on the same day an excavator was seen operating in the same place where the shelter was lowered, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

27. At 1510 hours on 5 April 1990, a large truck was seen carrying 15 cork sections for a pontoon foot-bridge, which were unloaded to the rear of the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 929849, 750 metres from our III Army Corps units.

28. At 0910 hours on 5 April 1990, a bulldozer was observed extending by 12 metres the old earthen embankment at co-ordinates 425935, east of Ali Na'ir, 7,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

29. At 1100 hours on 5 April 1990, the Iranians built an observation post of sandbags on the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 547232, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

30. At 1115 hours on 5 April 1990, the Iranians positioned concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 689149, 681149 and 667157, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

31. At 0830 hours on 5 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer, a roller and four dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 276698, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

32. At 0945 hours on 5 April 1990, three Iranians, one of them giving a commentary on the situation in the sector, were seen on the vessel at co-ordinates 438519, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

33. At 1010 hours on 5 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a roller and seven dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 452495, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

34. At 1030 hours on 5 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a roller and six dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 370595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

35. At 1030 hours on 5 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer, a tanker truck and seven dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 409558, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

36. At 1100 hours on 5 April 1990, a fork-lift was seen lowering five concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 309590, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

37. At 1115 hours on 5 April 1990, a truck was seen carrying 10 concrete shelter sections and a fork-lift, which lowered the sections at co-ordinates 281693, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

38. At 1120 hours on 5 April 1990, the Iranians fired one shot in the direction of our positions, which hit Sergeant Major Muhsin Ali Salih in the leg (a wound of medium seriousness in the left thigh), after cutting through the dense papyrus reeds in front of our positions at the security rampart at co-ordinates 365589, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

39. At 1035 hours on 5 April 1990, 15 Iranians built a roof shelter of sandbags inside our positions at co-ordinates 861223, 1,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

40. At 0700 hours on 6 April 1990, nine Iranians lined a canal with stones north of Musian at co-ordinates 247037, 3,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

41. At 0700 hours on 6 April 1990, three Iranians were seen fishing at co-ordinates 544223, 400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

42. At 1110 hours on 6 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 382589, 600 metres from VII Army Corps units.

43. At 1530 hours on 7 April 1990, a group of Iranians estimated to number 100, pitched a tent and positioned a trailer at co-ordinates 771581, 3,000 metres from our II Army Corps units, and an excavator was seen levelling the area.

44. Between 0830 and 1700 hours on 7 April 1990, a Poclain excavator was seen extending the Iranian embankment north of Musian at co-ordinates 253055. The extension is 200 metres long and 1.5 metres high, and the finished embankment is 2,104 metres long.

45. At 0930 hours on 7 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 547357, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

46. At 1000 hours on 7 April 1990, the Iranians built three 1.5-metre-high observation posts of sandbags roofed with concrete slabs at co-ordinates 514390, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

47. At 1000 hours on 7 April 1990, as a result of the flood waters and the speed of the current in the Shatt al-Arab, three fishing boats, each carrying two Iraqi civilians, were swept away so that the boats were near to the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab near the III Army Corps units in the restricted zone between the Abu Fulus river at co-ordinates 1472 and the village of Filiyah north of the Arayid river at co-ordinates 247150. They had been warned by our units to keep away from the zone, because fishing there is prohibited. When they approached the Iranian positions on the other side of the Arayid river, they were fired on by Iranians using an RPG-7 grenade launcher. One of the civilians was killed and fell into the Shatt al-Arab, while the five others, one of them wounded, were rescued by our units.

48. At 0830 hours on 7 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two excavators, a tanker truck and four dump trucks was seen raising the height of an embankment at co-ordinates 369595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

49. At 1900 hours on 7 April 1990, an Iranian truck was seen carrying nine concrete shelter sections and a fork-lift, which lowered them and distributed them at co-ordinates 439521, 437523 and 435525, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

50. At 1300 hours on 8 April 1990, an Iranian excavator built a 300-metre-long and 1.5-metre-high embankment at co-ordinates 771581, 300 metres from our II Army Corps units.

51. At 0750 hours on 8 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of 11 dump trucks and two rollers was seen mending a road at co-ordinates 462489, 700 metres from VII Army Corps units.

52. At 0850 hours on 8 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of five dump trucks and a grader was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 388583, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

53. At 2215 hours on 8 April 1990, the Iranians at the Iranian observation post at co-ordinates 593611, 3,075 metres from our VI Army Corps units, beamed a spotlight in the direction of our units intermittently until 2300 hours.

54. At 0820 hours on 9 April 1990, the Iranians set up a new 7-metre-high metal tower with a base for a cabin in the Curve area at co-ordinates 588718, 1,800 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

55. At 1130 hours on 9 April 1990, three Iranians set up a 7-metre-high radio antenna on one of the concrete shelters in front of the Curve area and then fixed a red flag on the same antenna at co-ordinates 584715, 1,400 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

56. At 0700 hours on 9 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a pick-up truck and five dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 673154, 1,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

57. At 0800 hours on 9 April 1990, two Iranians were seen fishing in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 545273, 400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

58. At 0910 hours on 9 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two excavators and seven dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 268703, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

59. At 0910 hours on 9 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and a roller was seen mending an embankment at co-ordinates 371595, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

60. At 0925 hours on 9 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 350591, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

61. Between 1000 and 1200 hours on 10 April 1990, a Poclain excavator was observed building a 100-metre-long and 1.5-metre-high extension to the first embankment, making the total length 2,240 metres, opposite the front north of Musian at co-ordinates 251055, 6,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

62. At 0800 hours on 10 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, two rollers and seven dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 681153, 1,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

63. At 1000 hours on 10 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 320595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

64. At 1030 hours on 10 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen placing earth on the Abadan channel spit at co-ordinates 355565, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units. At the same time, a fork-lift was seen lowering concrete shelter sections to the rear of the embankment at the same co-ordinates.

65. At 1035 hours on 10 April 1990, eight Iranians were seen setting up a firing post of sandbags at co-ordinates 248713, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

66. At 0945 hours on 10 April 1990, five Iranians were seen constructing a new guard post of wood and sheet iron north-west of Sarcheh at co-ordinates 962485, 2,500 metres from I Army Corps units.

67. At 2100 hours on 10 April 1990, the Iranians set up a searchlight on a utility pole at co-ordinates 583721, 1,058 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

68. 1 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 50-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-155 centimetres.

69. 2 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

70. 3 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

71. 4 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 150-150 centimetres.

72. 5 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989730, 15-150 centimetres.

73. 6 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 55-155 centimetres.

74. 7 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

75. 8 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 45-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

76. 9 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 40-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

77. 10 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 40-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 15-150 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative